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Prediction in quantum cosmology requires a specification of the universe’s quan-
tum dynamics and its quantum state. We expect only a few general features of the
universe to be predicted with probabilities near unity conditioned on the dynamics
and quantum state alone. Most useful predictions are of conditional probabilities
that assume additional information beyond the dynamics and quantum state. An-
thropic reasoning utilizes probabilities conditioned on ‘us’. This paper discusses the
utility, limitations, and theoretical uncertainty involved in using such probabilities.
The predictions resulting from various levels of ignorance of the quantum state are
discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
If the universe is a quantum mechanical system, then it has a quantum state. This state
provides the initial condition for cosmology. A theory of this state is an essential part of any
final theory summarizing the regularities exhibited universally by all physical systems and
is the objective of the subject of quantum cosmology. This essay is concerned with the role
the state of the universe plays in anthropic reasoning — the process of explaining features
of our universe from our existence in it [1]. The thesis will be that anthropic reasoning
in a quantum mechanical context depends crucially on assumptions about the universe’s
quantum state.
II. A MODEL QUANTUM UNIVERSE
Every prediction in a quantum mechanical universe depends on its state if only very
weakly. Quantum mechanics predicts probabilities for alternative possibilities, most gen-
erally the probabilities for alternative histories of the universe. The computation of these
probabilities requires both a theory of the quantum state as well as the theory of the dy-
namics specifying its evolution.
To make this idea concrete while keeping the discussion manageable, we consider a model
quantum universe. The details of this model are not essential to the subsequent discussion
of anthropic reasoning but help to fix the notation for probabilities and provide a specific
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2example of what they mean. Particles and fields move in a large, perhaps expanding box, say
presently 20,000 Mpc on a side. Quantum gravity is neglected — an excellent approximation
for accessible alternatives in our universe later than 10−43s from the big bang. Spacetime
geometry is thus fixed with a well defined notion of time and the usual quantum apparatus of
Hilbert space, states, and their unitary evolution governed by a Hamiltonian can be applied1.
The Hamiltonian H and the state |Ψ〉 in the Heisenberg picture are the assumed theoret-
ical inputs to the prediction of quantum mechanical probabilities. Alternative possibilities
at one moment of time t can be reduced to yes/no alternatives represented by an exhaustive
set of orthogonal projection operators {Pα(t)}, α = 1, 2, · · · in this Heisenberg picture. The
operators representing the same alternatives at different times are connected by
Pα(t) = e
iHt/~Pα(0) e
−iHt/~ . (2.1)
For instance, the P ’s could be projections onto an exhaustive set of exclusive ranges of the
center-of-mass position of the Earth labeled by α. The probabilities p(α) that the Earth is
located in one or another of these regions at time t is
p (α|H,Ψ) = ‖Pα(t) |Ψ〉‖
2 . (2.2)
The probabilities for the Earth’s location at a different time is given by the same formula
with different P ’s computed from the Hamiltonian by (2.1). The notation p (α|H,Ψ) departs
from usual conventions (e.g. [2]) to indicate explicitly that all probabilities are conditioned
on the theory of the Hamiltonian H and quantum state |Ψ〉.
Most generally quantum theory predicts the probabilities of sequences of alternatives at
a series of times — that is histories. An example is a sequence of ranges of center of mass
position of the Earth at a series of times giving a coarse-grained description of its orbit.
Sequences of sets of alternatives {P kαk(tk)} at a series of times tk, k = 1, · · · , n specify a set
of alternative histories of the model universe. An individual history α in the set corresponds
to a particular sequence of alternatives α ≡ (α1, α2, · · · , αn) and is represented by the
corresponding chain of projection operators Cα
Cα ≡ P
n
αn(tn) · · ·P
1
α1
(t1) , α ≡ (α1, · · · , αn) . (2.3)
The probabilities of the histories in the set are given by
p (α|H,Ψ) ≡ p (αn, · · · , α1|H,Ψ) = ‖Cα|Ψ〉‖
2 (2.4)
provided the set decoheres, i.e. provided the branch state vectors Cα|Ψ〉 are mutually or-
thogonal. Decoherence ensures the consistency of the probabilities (2.4) with the usual rules
of probability theory2.
To use either (2.2) or (2.4) to make predictions, a theory of both H and |Ψ〉 is needed.
No state; no predictions.
1 For a more detailed discussion of this model in the notation used here, see [2]. For a quantum framework
when spacetime geometry is not fixed, see e.g. [3].
2 For a short introduction to decoherence see [2] or any of the classic expositions of decoherent (consistent)
histories quantum theory [4, 5, 6].
3III. WHAT IS PREDICTED?
“If you know the wave function of the universe, why aren’t you rich?” This question was
once put to me by my colleague Murray Gell-Mann. The answer is that there are unlikely
to be any alternatives relevant to making money that are predicted as sure bets conditioned
just on the Hamiltonian and quantum state alone. A probability p(rise|H,Ψ) for the stock
market to rise tomorrow could be predicted from H and |Ψ〉 through (2.2) in principle. But
it seems likely that the result would be a useless p(rise|H,Ψ) ≈ 1/2 conditioned just on the
‘no boundary’ wave function [7] and M-theory.
It’s plausible that this is the generic situation. To be manageable and discoverable, the
theories of dynamics and the quantum state must be short — describable we in terms of a
few fundamental equations and the explanations of the symbols they contain. It’s therefore
unlikely that H and |Ψ〉 contain enough information to determine most of the interesting
complexity of the present universe with significant probability [8, 9]. We hope that the
Hamiltonian and the quantum state are sufficient conditions to predict certain large scale
features of the universe with significant probability. Approximately classical spacetime, the
number of large spatial dimensions, the approximate homogeneity and isotropy on scales
above several hundred Mpc, and the spectrum of density fluctuations that were the input
to inflation are some examples of these. But even a simple feature like the time the Sun
will rise tomorrow will not be usefully predicted by our present theories of dynamics and
the quantum state alone.
The time of sunrise does become predictable with high probability if a few previous
positions and orientations of the Earth in its orbit are supplied in addition to H and |Ψ〉.
That is a particular case of a conditional probability of the form
p (α|β,H,Ψ) =
p (α, β|H,Ψ)
p (β|H,Ψ)
(3.1)
for alternatives α (e.g. the times of sunrise) given H, |Ψ〉 and further alternatives β (e.g. a
few earlier positions and orientations of the Earth). The joint probabilities on the right
hand side of (3.1) are computed using (2.4) as described in Section II.
Conditioning probabilities on specific information can weaken their dependence on H and
|Ψ〉 but does not eliminate it. That is because any specific information available to us as
human observers (like a few positions of the Earth) is but a small part of that needed to
specify the state of the universe. The Pβ used to define the joint probabilities in (3.1) by
(2.4) therefore spans a very large subspace of Hilbert space. As a consequence Pβ|Ψ〉 depends
strongly on |Ψ〉. For example, to extrapolate present data on the Earth to its position 24
hours from now requires that the probability be high that it moves on a classical orbit in
that time and that the probability be low that it is destroyed by a neutron star now racing
across the galaxy at near light speed. Both of these probabilities depend crucially, if weakly,
on the nature of the quantum state [10].
Many useful predictions in physics are of conditional probabilities of the kind discussed
in this section. We next turn to the question of whether we should be part of the conditions.
4IV. ANTHROPIC REASONING — LESS IS MORE
A. Anthropic Probabilities
In calculating the conditional probabilities for predicting some of our observations given
others, there can be no objection of principle to including a description of ‘us’ as part of the
conditions,
p (α|β, ‘us’, H,Ψ) . (4.1)
Drawing inferences using such probabilities is called anthropic reasoning. The motivation is
the idea is that probabilities for certain features of the universe might be sensitive to this
inclusion.
The utility of anthropic reasoning depends on how sensitive probabilities like (4.1) are
to the inclusion of ‘us’. To make this concrete, consider the probabilities for a hypothetical
cosmological parameter we will call Λ. We will assume that H and |Ψ〉 imply that Λ is
constant over the visible universe, but only supply probabilities for the various constant
values it might take through (2.4). We seek to compare p (Λ|H,Ψ) with p (Λ|‘us’, H,Ψ). In
principle, both are calulable from (2.4) and (3.1). Figure 1 shows three possible ways they
might be related:
• p (Λ|H,Ψ) is peaked around one value as in Fig. 1(a). The parameter Λ is determined
either by H or |Ψ〉, or by both.3 Anthropic reasoning is not necessary; the parameter
is already determined by fundamental physics.
• p (Λ|H,Ψ) is distributed and p (Λ|‘us’, H,Ψ) is also distributed as in Fig. 1(b). An-
thropic reasoning is inconclusive. One might as well measure the value of Λ and use
this as a condition for making further predictions4 i.e. work with probabilities of the
form p (α|Λ, H,Ψ).
• p (Λ|H,Ψ) is distributed but p (Λ|‘us’, H,Ψ) is peaked. Anthropic reasoning helps to
explain the value of Λ.
The important point to emphasize is that a theoretical hypothesis for H and |Ψ〉 is needed
to carry out anthropic reasoning. Put differently, a theoretical context is needed to decide
whether a parameter like Λ can vary, and to find out how it varies, before using anthropic
reasoning to restrict its range. The Hamiltonian and quantum state provide this context.
In the Section V we will consider the situation where the state is imperfectly known.
B. Less is More
While there can be no objections of principle to including ‘us’ as a condition for the
probabilities of our observations, there are formidable obstacles of practice:
• We are complex physical systems requiring an extensive environment and a long evo-
lutionary history whose description in terms of the fundamental variables of H and
|Ψ〉 may be uncertain, long, and complicated.
3 As, for example, in the as yet inconclusive discussions of baby universes [12].
4 As stressed by Hawking and Hertog [13].
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FIG. 1: Some possible behaviors for probabilities for the value of a cosmological parameter Λ with
and without the condition ‘us’ are illustrated. In the situation illustrated in (a) the value of Λ
is fixed by H and |Ψ〉 and anthropic reasoning is not needed. In (b) anthropic probabilities are
distributed so that anthropic reasoning is useless in fixing Λ. Anthropic reasoning is useful in the
situation (c).
• The complexity of the description of a condition including ‘us’ may make the calcula-
tion of the probabilities long or impossible as a practical matter.
In practice, therefore, anthropic probabilities (4.1) can only be estimated or guessed. The-
oretical uncertainty in the results is thereby introduced.
The objectivity striven for in physics consists, at least in part, in using probabilities
that are not too sensitive to ‘us’. We would not have science if anthropic probabilities
for observation depended significantly on which individual human being was part of the
conditions. The existence of schizophrenic delusions shows that this is possible so that the
notion of ‘us’ should be restricted to exclude such cases.
For these reasons it is prudent to condition probabilities, not on a detailed description of
‘us’, but on the weakest condition consistent with ‘us’ that plausibly provides useful results
like those illustrated in Fig. 1c. A short list of conditions of roughly decreasing complexity
might include:
• human beings;
• carbon-based life;
• information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes);
• at least one galaxy;
• a universe older than 5 Gyr;
• no condition at all.
For example, the probabilities used to bound the cosmological constant Λ [1, 14] make use
of the fourth and fifth on this list under the assumption that including earlier ones will
not much affect the anthropically-allowed range for Λ. To move down in the above list
of conditions is to move in the direction of increasing theoretical certainty and decreasing
computational complexity. With anthropic reasoning, less is more.
6V. IGNORANCE IS NOT BLISS
The quantum state of a single isolated subsystem generally cannot be determined from
a measurement carried out on it. That is because the outcomes of measurements are dis-
tributed probabilistically and the outcome of a single trial does not determine the distri-
bution. Neither can the state be determined from a series of measurements because mea-
surements disturb the state of the subsystem. The Hamiltonian can not be inferred from a
sequence of measurements on one subsystem for similar reasons. In the same way, we can
not generally determine either the Hamiltonian or the quantum state of the universe from
our observations of it. Rather these two parts of a final theory are theoretical proposals,
inferred from partial data to be sure, but incorporating theoretical assumptions of simplicity,
beauty, coherence, mathematical precision, etc. To test these proposals we search among
the conditional probabilities they imply for predictions of observations yet to be made with
probabilities very near one. When such predictions occur we count it a success of the theory,
when they do not we reject it and propose another.
Do we need a theory of the quantum state? To analyze this question, let us consider
various degrees of theoretical uncertainty about it.
A. Total Ignorance
In the model cosmology in a box of Section II, theoretical uncertainty about the quantum
state can be represented by a density matrix ρ that specifies probabilities for its eigenstates
to be |Ψ〉. Total ignorance of the quantum state is represented by a ρ proportional to the
unit matrix. To illustrate this and the subsequent discussion, assume for the moment that
the dimension of the Hilbert space is very large but finite. Then total ignorance of the
quantum state is represented by
ρtot. ign. =
I
Tr(I)
(5.1)
which assigns equal probability any to any member of any complete set of orthogonal states.
The density matrix (5.1) predicts thermal equilibrium, infinite temperature, infinitely
large field fluctuations, and maximum entropy [9]. In short, its predictions are inconsistent
with observations. This is a more precise way of saying that every useful prediction depends
in some way on a theory of the quantum state. Ignorance is not bliss.
B. What We Know
A more refined approach to avoiding theories of the quantum state is to assume that it
is unknown except for reproducing our present observations of the universe. The relevant
density matrix is
ρobs =
Pobs
Tr(Pobs)
(5.2)
where Pobs is the projection on our current observations — “what we know”. ‘Observations’
in this context mean what we directly observe and record here on Earth and not the infer-
ences we draw from this data about the larger universe. That is because those inferences are
7based on assumptions about the very quantum state that (5.2) aims to ignore. For instance,
we observed nebulae long before we understood what they were or where they are. The
inference that the nebulae are distant clusters of stars and gas relies on assumptions about
how the universe is structured on very large scales that are in effect weak assumptions on
the quantum state.
Even if we made the overly generous assumption that we had somehow directly observed
and recorded every detail of the volume 1 km above the surface of the Earth, say at a
1 mm resolution, that is still a tiny fraction (∼ 10−60) of the volume inside the present
cosmological horizon. The projection operator Pobs therefore defines a very large subspace
of Hilbert space. We can expect that the entropy of the density matrix (5.2) will therefore be
near maximal, close to that of (5.1), and its predictions similarly inconsistent with further
observations.
In the context of anthropic reasoning, these results show that conditioning probabilities
on ‘us’ alone is not enough to make useful predictions. Rather, a theory of H and |Ψ〉 are
needed in addition as described in the previous section.
VI. A FINAL THEORY
Let us hope that one day we will have a unified theory based on a principle that will
specify both quantum dynamics (H) and a unique quantum state of the universe (|Ψ〉). That
would truly be a final theory and a proper context for anthropic reasoning.
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